Subject: Re: Logic deemed illogical! Area man protests.
AntiUtopia@aol.com
Date: Mon Jan 10 2000 - 07:43:44 EST
In a message dated 1/10/00 3:24:19 AM Eastern Standard Time,
sgabriel@willamette.edu writes:
<< Exactly. My point is that everything falls of out of how you pick your
'+' operator. I mean, both '+' operators have a context for which they
are useful. Would the REAL '+' operator please stand up? There is none.
This is because we make '+' operators as we go, to fit whatever context we
may be talking about at the time.
I could just as easily pick '>' to be an operator that means "is the
father of." Then, it would not be transitive as my grandfather is clearly
not also my father. Once we fix a meaning to '>' then it is transitive or
not. The way you are talking about such operators though, you really want
to imply that '>' is transitive long before a meaning is fixed for it.
I hope this makes sense. If not, please put forth another email about it.
It's quite nice to have a chance to talk about an issue that I find can be
very confused.
S. >>
This part of the discussion is really interesting to me because it parallels
something I'm reading now -- Stanley Fish's _Is There a Text In This Class_?
He makes similar claims about language -- that there is no set meaning
inherent in a text, utterance, whathaveyou, but that meaning for each
utterance is context-specific. He argues well for a point I pretty much
already agreed with, but I do have some differences with him.
What I think I'm coming to think is that the ideal we're striving for is a
"one word-one meaning" correspondence. That a word can only be used one way
in any set of circumstances. This doesn't exist and probably never will.
Fish's construct explains what's going on with this facet of the list
discussion quite well, actually. In the context of this discussion, the
reason 1+1=2 means diffferent things with raindrops and apples is because the
+ sign means slightly different things in both cases. The meaning of the +
sign is context specific. Both sides recognize this. Steven wasn't engaging
in semantic gymnastics, but pointing out that even in the simplest possible
utterance meaning is ambiguous without a definite context being provided.
The only way to avoid this is for us to have two different plus signs -- one
that applies to situations such as the apple and another that applies to
situations such as the raindrop. There may be still further modifications of
the + idea. Those would need further signs.
What this leads to is the assertion that logic is a human construct and not a
property of nature. But I think we haven't fully examined the opposition
we've set up here. We're still opposing the "human mind" to "nature," in
that we believe "constructs" are "unnatural." But what we're ignoring is the
implications of this opposition. While we believe that reason occurs within
nature (our minds are a part of nature), we also believe it stands apart from
it to some degree, above it and outside it. Like it or not, this is an
implicit bow to the existence of the supernatural. The Greeks recognized
this and some form of theism was always a part of their cosmology and
metaphysics.
Any form of reasoning from nature involves such a recognition. Robbie's
citation of the "mother's compassion for her children" involves such a
recognition. Because he's not just going on "raw nature" in his choice.
Whenever we look to nature for guidance, we find it sends us mixed messages
about pretty much everything -- from how we treat outsiders to how we treat
our own children. And that means we have to choose which part of nature
we're going to follow. Once we admit this, however, we've admitted to a
capacity that stands above or outside of nature and is capable of judging
between one part of nature (the part that's acceptable to us and capable of
providing norms for our behavior) and another (the part that's unacceptable
or irrelevant). Again, a bow to the supernatural.
Jim
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