Steven Gabriel wrote: > Why a first property? Take the example of geometry. If you take an axiom > (roughly equivalent to a property) out you lose a lot of the system. > Euclid and others spent decades trying to knock out an axiom and failed. > Let's say you could sum up all 5 in one property. It would be equivalent > to listing all five properties and putting "ands" between them. [cut] In order for you to develop axioms or properties, you need phenomena. What allows us to detect phenomena? I'm talking about the moment before properties began to be thought about. Not, in this case, how do sentences work, but how can we have words. We are arguing different points now, I think. I am arguing there must be a principle in place that allows us to distinguish the phenomena for which we develop axioms. How do you know there is geometry? Becuase the differences between things allows you to see things as distinct phenomena. You would never know what darkness was unless it could be contrasted with something different, like light. So how could you go about making observations about darkness until you were aware of its counterpart, light? Not only the word "darkness" and its synonyms, but also in part the whole concept of darkness is thinkable only when there is something different with which to contrast it. Meaning is possible only because of difference. > And my shoelaces are wearing thin as is. But I'm finding it all very fascinating. Since my last post, I have, quite uncharacteristically, gone out and bought a copy of the Hofstadter book you recommended (incidentally, the index does not mention Derrida or Saussre, but it does mention Thomas Kuhn...I anticipate certain disciplinary favoritisms). I am willing to concede that perhaps the discussion should be moved elsewhere (bananafish are *very* peculiar), but, company provided, I am quite happy to continue. -- Matt Kozusko mkozusko@parallel.park.uga.edu